

# Desinformation und Fake News: Sind die digitalen Medien schuld daran?

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
# Was sind "Fake News"?

		<i>Absichtlich schädlich</i>	
		Ja	Nein
<i>Trügerisch</i>	Ja	Des-information	Mis-information
	Nein	Mal-information	Information

# Was sagt die Forschung dazu?

1. Häufigkeit und Anfälligkeit: kein Massenphänomen
2. Wirkungen: indirekt eher als direkt
3. Massnahmen: verschiedene Optionen, nicht einfach

# 2016: im Durchschnitt 1.14 Fake News gelesen




(Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017)

# 2016: 0.1% der Nutzer teilten 80% der Fake News

**Fig. 1. Prevalence over time and concentration of fake news sources.** (A) Daily percentage of exposures to black, red, and orange fake news sources, relative to all exposures to political URLs.


Exposures were summed across all panel members. (B to D) Empirical cumulative distribution functions showing distribution of exposures among websites (B), distribution of shares by panel members (C), and distribution of exposures among panel members (D). The x axis represents percentage of websites or panel members responsible for a given

percentage (y axis) of all exposures or shares. Black, red, and orange lines represent fake news sources; blue line denotes all other sources. This distribution was not comparable for (B) because of the much larger number of sources in its tail and the fundamentally different selection process involved.



(Grinberg et al., 2019)

# 2016: 91.5% der Nutzer haben keine Fake News geteilt




**Fig. 1. Distribution of total and fake news shares.** (Left) Histogram of the total number of links to articles on the web shared by respondents in the sample who identified as Democrats, Republicans, or independents. (Right) Stacked histogram of the number of fake news articles shared by respondents who identified as Democrats, Republicans, or independents using the measure derived from (7).


Table 1. Distribution of fake news shares.						
0	1	2	3	4	5-10	11-50
1090 (91.5%)	63 (5.3%)	12 (1.0%)	8 (<1.0%)	5 (<1.0%)	9 (<1.0%)	4 (<1.0%)

(Guess et al., 2019)

# 2016: Senioren teilten 7-fach mehr Fake News als 18-29-Jährige



A




B

(Guess et al., 2019)




# 2016: 60% der Fake News von Konservativen gelesen

(a) Fake news visit (binary)




(b) Total fake news (mean articles)




(Guess et al., 2018)

# 2016: Meisten Fake News von Konservativen geteilt



C



D

(Guess et al., 2019)

# Direkte Effekte der Desinformation eher klein


**Table 2 | Correlates of Trump support and voter turnout in the 2016 election**

	Trump support				Voter turnout			
	$\beta$	s.e.	P	95% CI	$\beta$	s.e.	P	95% CI
Clinton supporter (July)	-0.19	0.04	0.00	-0.26 to -0.12	-0.05	0.04	0.25	-0.14-0.04
Trump supporter (July)	0.69	0.04	0.00	0.61-0.78	-0.06	0.04	0.12	-0.13-0.02
Untrustworthy conservative website exposure (binary)	0.05	0.03	0.08	-0.01-0.11	0.04	0.03	0.23	-0.02-0.10
Liberal information diet	-0.05	0.03	0.09	-0.10-0.01	0.04	0.04	0.33	-0.04-0.12
Conservative information diet	0.01	0.02	0.78	-0.04-0.05	-0.03	0.04	0.43	-0.10-0.04
Political knowledge	-0.01	0.01	0.28	-0.02-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.36	-0.03-0.01
Political interest	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01-0.07	0.02	0.02	0.47	-0.03-0.06
College	-0.06	0.03	0.03	-0.11 to -0.01	-0.02	0.03	0.44	-0.08-0.03
Female	-0.01	0.02	0.54	-0.06-0.03	-0.00	0.03	0.93	-0.06-0.06
Non-white	-0.01	0.03	0.69	-0.08-0.05	-0.02	0.04	0.59	-0.10-0.05
Age 30-44 years	0.07	0.05	0.11	-0.02-0.16	0.06	0.05	0.26	-0.04-0.15
Age 45-59 years	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.00-0.15	0.06	0.05	0.29	-0.05-0.16
Age 60+ years	0.12	0.04	0.00	0.04-0.21	0.03	0.04	0.46	-0.05-0.12
Constant	0.07	0.09	0.42	-0.10-0.25	0.24	0.08	0.00	0.08-0.40
Controls for past turnout	No				Yes			
R <sup>2</sup>	0.77				0.53			
n	1,715				1,715			

OLS models with survey weights (two-sided P values). Online traffic statistics for 7-21 October 2016 among YouGov Pulse panel members. Trump support was measured in a survey conducted during 21-31 October 2016. YouGov matched validated vote data from TargetSmart to survey respondents. Controls for past turnout are separate indicators for voting in the 2012 presidential primaries, the 2016 presidential primaries and the 2012 general election (full results are provided in the Supplementary Information).

(Guess et al., 2020)

# Indirekte Effekte auf zB Vertrauen in Medien



(Vaccari and Chadwick, 2020)


# Massnahmen gegen Desinformation

	<i>Individuen</i>	<i>Online-Plattformen</i>
<i>Vorher</i>	Bildung	Sperren
<i>Nachher</i>	Korrektur	Faktenchecks Reichweite reduzieren

(Adaptiert von Nyhan, 2020, 230)

# Faktenchecks haben eine gewisse Wirkung


**Fig. 1** Effects of general and specific warnings on the perceived accuracy of false headlines. Mean belief that false headlines were accurate on a four-point Likert scale from “Not at all accurate” (1) to “Very accurate” (4). See Online Appendix A for question wording and stimulus materials



(Clayton et al., 2020)

## ...aber auch gewisse Nebenwirkungen

**Fig. 3** General warning effects on belief in true and false news articles. Mean belief that true and false news headlines were accurate on a four-point Likert scale from “Not at all accurate” (1) to “Very accurate” (4). See Online Appendix A for question wording and stimulus materials



(Clayton et al., 2020)

Machen Sie mit!




9. Februar 2021, <https://dezentrum.typeform.com/to/t5Ot8TEW>



Zuverlässige Forschung ist aufwendig, zerfällt schnell





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